Abstract-The successful operation of emerging public wireless LANs requires flexible network mechanisms that can support differentiated or tiered services for a variety of applications such as bursty transactional web applications as well as reservation demanding voice and video applications. Congestion pricing has been proposed as one promising solution to traffic control because it accurately models the cost that each user's traffic imposes on network congestion points. The underlying assumption of congestion pricing is that users will respond to a monetary-based price signal to maximize their own utility. We observe, however, that monetary service charge is largely a business concern and not a traffic control concern because operators and users prefer simple, predictable, and stable service charges such as flat-rate or block-rate charging. Therefore, we argue, that traffic control techniques such as congestion pricing should be decoupled from monetary service charges. Under such a new regime, however, a user's response to a non-monetary price signal would be quite different from utility maximization, and without the appropriate incentives for users to cooperate such a regime would lead to the "tragedy of the commons" phenomenon, undermining any future differentiated service offerings by wireless Internet service providers. To address this problem we propose wireless incentive engineering mechanisms for mobile devices and access points that provide incentives for mobile users to cooperatively use different classes of services without relying on monetary service charging. Wireless incentive engineering possesses a number of beneficial properties including minimizing the algorithmic and protocol overhead on mobile devices and access points, Nash bargaining fairness, and incentive compatibility for mobile users promoting the truthful selection of service class and bandwidth declaration. We use analysis, simulation, and experimental results from a wireless testbed to demonstrate the effectiveness of wireless incentive engineering.
I. INTRODUCTION
C OMMERCIAL deployment of public wireless LANs [1] and MANs [2] is accelerating, and is likely to displace 3G [3] [4] as the primary wireless access to the Internet and Web services in the near future. While IEEE 802.11 dominates the enterprise a number of challenges remain for its wide-scale public deployment, in particular, there is a need for service providers to offer services capable of supporting a wide variety of applications from bursty transactional web applications to more reservation demanding voice and video applications. The current engineering approach taken by cellular networks relies upon a tightly controlled (e.g., circuit-based) environment for wireless voice and data. This approach does not scale well given the increasing diversity of applications and device Raymond Liao is with Siemens TTB, 1995 University Ave., Suite 375, Berkeley, CA 94704, USA. This research was conducted while he was with the Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Columbia University. Rita Wouhaybi and Andrew T. Campbell are with the Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Columbia University, New York, NY10027, USA. E-mail: {liao, rita, campbell}@comet.columbia.edu programmability emerging. In contrast, edge-based wireless LANs inherit both the simplicity and the best-effort service model of the Internet. However, in order to deliver better than best-effort services (e.g., IEEE 802.11e) in a wireless LANbased access networks, there is a need for rate regulation techniques [5] . These techniques include traffic shaping at both mobile devices and access points, with the addition of admission control at network access points to enforce service differentiation and fend off any potentially abusive usage such as denial of service attacks or bandwidth hogging, where users reserve bandwidth without using it for long periods of time. However, access rate regulation is challenging to get right. Static rate regulation mechanisms are too simple to efficiently control bursty transactional applications such as web browsing, and measurement-based schemes can potentially generate large amounts of control messaging to adjust the rate parameters at mobile devices. In addition, bandwidth reservation mechanisms involve a difficult trade-off in mobile environments between guaranteeing the full duration of a bandwidth reservation and inhibiting excessive bandwidth hogging. Hard reservation guarantees bear the complexity of admission control when multi-tiered service (e.g., differentiated services) quality is required. This requires applications to declare their session duration in advance, which none of the widely deployed applications can do easily.
Congestion pricing has been proposed as one promising solution to traffic control problems because it accurately models the cost that each user's traffic imposes on network congestion points. Congestion pricing is also well suited for distributed implementation because of the distributed nature of market mechanisms in "shifting the onus to users". The underlying assumption of congestion pricing is that users will respond to a monetary-based price signal to maximize their own utility. We observe, however, that the deployment of monetary congestion pricing is not very practical for several reasons. First, service charge is largely a business concern and not a traffic control concern. For example, marketing schemes often result in rate changes due to service promotion and/or fighting subscriber churn regardless of network traffic load. This is one typical "tussle" found in the network architecture space, as identified by Clark et.al in [6] . Second, the time-varying nature of congestion pricing is not a preferred pricing scheme for service providers and end users. Market evidence has shown that the prevailing charging model for wireless access services is block-rate charging, which comprises a fixed charge for usage within a block of air time or bytes delivered, and a higher flat rate charge for any usage that exceeds the block amount. This type of charging is preferred by users because of price stability and predictability, and by service providers because of the simplicity of the design of the billing infrastructure [7] - [9] . Third, there exits a time-scale difference of a number of orders of magnitude between a congestion interval and a service billing period (e.g., seconds vs. one month), which means that a congestion surcharge would be too minuscule for users to care about if the total service charge is on the order of tens of dollars. Finally, even if users are interested in responding to a small congestion pricing signal, the dynamic interactions among users will result in a complicated repeated game whose convergence and equilibrium properties may be poor, resulting in potentially large amounts of renegotiation messages and variations in bandwidth allocations. Therefore, we argue that traffic control techniques such as congestion pricing should be decoupled from any monetary service charges. Under such a new regime, however, a user's response to a non-monetary price signal would be quite different from utility maximization, and without the appropriate incentives for users to cooperate such a regime would lead to the well-known "tragedy of the commons" phenomenon [10] , undermining any future differentiated service offerings by wireless Internet service providers.
In this paper, we address these problems by proposing incentive engineering techniques for edge-based wireless networks that create incentives for mobile users to truthfully self-differentiate their service needs based on their application requirements. We introduce a service control parameter called service purchasing power, which plays the same role as a service budget but covers the internal price of resource usage. By defining service purchasing power as a non-accumulated and non-replenished budget, we simplify the strategy space of users by removing budget control from their concern. We create incentives with a price-service menu for mobile users to self-differentiate based on their application needs. The priceservice menu is periodically broadcast by base stations to direct the rate adjustment of all mobile devices in a particular cell, hence reducing the need for per-mobile rate-control messaging. The price-service menu comprises two incentivebased service classes: an instantaneous allocation (IA) class, which provides better throughput, and a stable allocation (SA) class, which provides better allocation stability.
The IA and SA service classes trade off the average amount of allocated bandwidth with allocation stability; that is, a price-service menu provides a ranking of service classes with decreasing bandwidth allocation stability and per-unit internal price, but with increasing prospects for higher bandwidth allocation. As a result, data applications can opt for the IA service class, which will on average offer better bandwidth allocation to sessions, but at the cost of more instability in the offered bandwidth. To offset this instability in the allocated bandwidth, real-time applications seeking better service quality can pay a premium to use the SA service class, which provides stable bandwidth allocation but usually results in smaller amounts of allocated bandwidth to a session in comparison to the IA service. There lies the inherent trade-off in the offered services between the two classes.
The rate control for the IA service is measurement-based to efficiently regulate bursty transactional applications. The enforcement algorithm only resides inside the access networks and does not require users to estimate their own bandwidth demands. We approach the bandwidth reservation problem with a "soft" guarantee on the duration of SA service reservations. The "softness" of the guarantee follows the rank of the reservation's internal bid price, which is proportional to the SA service purchasing power. Users with higher SA service purchasing power will less likely see early termination of their reservations. As a result, the SA class does not require users to predict their session lifetime. To make the scheme more usable, a "warning interval" is implemented for sessions that are in danger of early termination to renegotiate if need be. This feature practically mirrors application operating conditions because typically applications cannot predict their session bandwidth demands nor the session duration in advance, as discussed above.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section II we present the economics background for incentive engineering and related work. This is followed in Section III by an overview of our wireless incentive engineering model including the price-service menu and messaging protocol. We discuss the incentive-based control algorithms for IA and SA classes in Section IV and Section V, respectively. In Section VI, we discuss the properties of our wireless incentive engineering scheme in the context of the mobile device dominant strategy. We demonstrate that the best strategy for a user is to cooperate with the network traffic control system. In Section VII, we evaluate our algorithms in an experimental wireless testbed that also supports an emulation capability, which further helps evaluate the system under different conditions and scenarios. Finally, we present some concluding remarks in Section VIII.
II. ECONOMICS BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Incentive engineering stems from the discipline of mechanism design in economics theory, which structures the strategy space of users such that a user's self-optimizing choice of action is "incentive compatible" with the system optimization goal. One typical example is the Clarke-Groves mechanism [11] that charges a user the amount of payoff displaced from all the other users due to the allocation to the user, (i.e., the shadow price of this allocation on all other users). An example of the Clarke-Groves mechanism is the Vickrey's second-price auction [12] , which charges winning bidders the highest losing bid. The salient property of the ClarkeGroves pricing mechanism is incentive-compatibility, namely truth-telling is a dominant strategy for users. Our work is inspired by the seminal work of Drexler and Miller [13] on mechanism design for operating systems for the dual purpose of inducing cooperative behavior over computational resources and reducing market transaction cost.
Our work can be viewed as a continuation of the argument advocated in [14] ; that is, monetary charge for network service is better based on system level architectural issues rather than the "economically optimal" marginal cost. We argue that to provide stable and predictable service charges, fast time-scale market-based traffic control mechanisms should be decoupled from monetary charges. When pricing is non-monetary, existing congestion pricing mechanisms [15] - [17] are not applicable because non-cooperative users have no incentive to truthfully respond to a non-monetary "price signal" offered by the network control system. Consequently, rather than maximizing the difference between the utility and cost functions, users will solely maximize their utility functions and ignore the cost function as long as the non-monetary cost is below the non-monetary budget. Our wireless incentive engineering design turns this non-cooperative game into an equivalence of a Nash bargaining solution [18] , [19] , whose operating point has better properties, (i.e., Pareto optimum and Nash bargaining fair), than the Nash equilibrium operating point for a non-cooperative congestion pricing market. We can achieve this goal because our engineering design effectively limits the user's strategy space, such that, the dominant strategy coincides with the Nash bargaining solution. In addition, the implementation of our wireless incentive engineering mechanisms is more efficient than maintaining a non-cooperative market of multi-round auction or tatonnement process, where renegotiation delays and convergence problems are common to users playing extensive strategies in a repeated game setting [11] .
There are two ways to design service models that promote self-differentiation among users: differentiated pricing or service classes tailored toward specific user groups. The Paris Metro Price [20] is an example of using two-tier pricing to realize differentiated services without any additional network mechanisms. In contrast, the Alternative Best Effort service proposed in [21] is a good example of designing two alternative service classes, each of which is preferred by data and multimedia users, respectively. Our service model employs both methods. We design differentiated pricing to regulate demand for stable allocation, and differentiated service classes by considering the trade-off between allocation stability and allocation quantity. Unlike [21] that leverages the trade-off between packet loss and throughput but requires modification of packet schedulers, our service differentiation is at the session level and is therefore independent of any packet scheduler.
The idea of pricing allocation stability is similar in spirit to Wilson's priority service pricing scheme for rationing supplies [22] , which has been used as a basis for electric power distribution systems. Wilson proposes this scheme for industries where spot pricing is not efficiently deployable, due to the pervasive transaction cost and technical limitations. In [23] priority pricing is used to price best-effort multi-QoS network services. The difference again is that in [22] and [23] optimal prices are calculated assuming that users will maximize their payoff function, while in our case, users would rather use up their budget to maximize their utility functions because the budget is non-monetary and non-accumulative.
Budget control has been a largely overlooked problem, which is caused by an inherent time-scale mismatch; that is, monthly-based block-rate usage budget (in minutes) and usage accounting are not sensitive to bursts of usage at sessionlevel time-scales. Consequently, such a charging model does not offer incentives for users to cooperate during periods of network congestion. The only work similar to our nonaccumulated and non-replenished budget is the User Share Differentiation [24] proposed for differentiated service. Our proposal of service purchasing power is not only a parameter for relative service differentiation, as is the case of [24] , but also a budget in the Nash bargaining solution driving marketbased bandwidth allocation mechanisms at the session-level time-scales.
There have been a number engineering proposals related to the design of practical market mechanisms for network traffic control. In [25] two separate markets are used, one for the spot bandwidth and the other for the reserved bandwidth. However, the pricing mechanisms for both markets are based on the demand-supply tatonnement process without consideration of the opportunity cost of bandwidth reservation over the spot market bandwidth. In [8] , [26] , engineering efforts are used to model the opportunity cost for differentiated service classes. The proposed service charge involves congestion, time, and volume based pricing components, each of which requires parameter tuning. This heuristic approach bears large complexity for multiple service types.
The exact calculation of the opportunity cost for bandwidth reservations is best represented by [27] in the form of a derivative pricing instrument over the bandwidth spot market. However, these schemes are not practical in support of wireless services because the access network bandwidth that is traded has a minuscule valuation over the fast congestion-control time-scale. For example, the widely used Black-Scholes [28] formula for calculating option premium relies on a reference risk-free investment instrument, (i.e., the interest rate income). In the case of traffic control the equivalent risk-free alternative cannot be interest rate income because the value would be too small for any users to care about 1 . In mobile and wireless networks, market mechanisms have been applied in a very limited manner. In [29] , a revenue framework is proposed to resolve some of the adaptation policy trade-offs. The scheme provides incentives for adaptation by charging sessions that benefit from the adaptation, while compensating sessions that suffer from adaptation. However, the exact calculation of credits and charges are challenging and are not formulated in [29] . In [30] , the authors analyze the property of the Paris Metro Pricing [20] scheme within the context of wireless access services. The service offering is limited with no support for allocation stability. Because price is non-monetary in our scheme, we use conventional measurement-based traffic prediction and handoff admission control to assure handoff performance. There has been a large body of work in the literature on handoff admission control. For a recent survey and performance comparison, see [31] .
III. WIRELESS INCENTIVE ENGINEERING MODEL
A. Network Model Figure 1 illustrates a wireless access network architecture in the context of IEEE 802.11 WLAN networks. Note, that the particular cellular network topology shown is for illustration only, and not essential to our framework. We use the terms "mobile device" and "access point" in a generic sense. At access points, per-mobile and per-class traffic regulators are used to regulate downlink traffic. In addition, each mobile device optionally uses per-class traffic regulators in the form of policers or shapers to self-regulate uplink traffic. User profiles containing service specific resource allocation policies are stored at the Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) server at the mobile device's home network, and delivered to a visiting network by a mobility management protocol. We assume that there is a broadcast channel at the media access control (MAC) layer from the access point to all the mobile devices in a particular cell. Our incentive engineering mechanisms are applied at the session bandwidth allocation level, involving traffic regulator modules at mobile devices and access points. Fast time-scale packet scheduling algorithms are not affected.
B. Service Purchasing Power
Typically, service budget (e.g., the number of "free" minutes within a service plan) is not allowed to accumulate, otherwise, idle users could carry-over large amounts of unused budget, distorting the market mechanism. Therefore, users have no incentive to conserve budget toward the end of the budget replenishing cycle, and could subsequently start a spending spree, distorting the market mechanism as well.
To address this problem we introduce a parameter called service purchasing power, which plays the same role as a service budget but covers the internal price of resource usage. By defining service purchasing power as a non-accumulated and non-replenished budget, we avoid the difficulty of budget control. With the service purchasing power known to the network, a user's strategy space is essentially constrained by the price-service menu (see Section III.C), which induces user cooperation, avoiding over allocation of bandwidth, and enforcing the truthful declaration of reservation bandwidth. Allowing users to choose between service classes in this manner helps promote self-differentiation among user applications, enabling differentiated resource allocation.
Each user (i.e., mobile device) is assigned a service purchasing power ϑ i , which plays the role of a "constant budget". The value of ϑ i for each user is determined by the network. For example, a premium user may be given a large ϑ i to afford relatively high priced bandwidth. ϑ i is part of the user's profile stored at the AAA server. Alternatively, ϑ i could be stored at the mobile device in an encrypted format together with the mobile device ID, and then passed to the wireless access network during registration and handoff operations. Each mobile device partitions its service purchasing power as it wishes into portions for IA and SA allocation (see Section III.D), denoted as ϑ i,I and ϑ i,S , respectively. Since access points are aware of ϑ i and the corresponding allotment to SA reservation ϑ i,S through a mobile device initiated reservation request, the IA portion of service purchasing power can be derived as,
Because service purchasing power is not monetary, its relative value across different user profiles is more important than its absolute value. For example, as we will shown later in Section VII, the ratio of IA bandwidth allocation to two users is the same as the ratio of their IA service purchasing power.
C. Price-Service Menu
Our incentive engineering mechanisms use a market-based price to distribute allocation information and regulate bandwidth usage. Each access point l periodically broadcasts a nonmonetary price-service menu within its cell, driven by price change. The price-service menu comprises the price of the IA and SA classes, p l,I and p l,S respectively, as well as p l,H , the price for a subclass of SA called handoff allocation (HA). The HA class enforces price differentiation that any mobile devices with ϑ i,S < p l,H will be denied handoff for lack of service purchasing power. We represent the price-service menu of access point l in a price vector: p l,I , p l,S , p l,H . The SA class requires a per-mobile reservation message between a mobile device and its access point, as shown in Figure 1 . An SA reservation has three parameters: the requested bandwidth quantities b i,S U b i,S D for uplink and downlink, respectively, and the allotted SA portion of service purchasing power ϑ i,S . The handoff price p l,H (t) is derived as follows:
where A(l) denotes the set of adjacent access points of l. This is equivalent to stating that a mobile device's service purchasing power ϑ i,S ≥ p l i,H will be high enough to acquire bandwidth at neighboring cells. Here, with an abuse of notation, we use l i to denote the cell l where the mobile device i is active. We note that with mobility prediction, the size of A i (l) for each mobile device i can be reduced. For example, in a mobile-initiated handoff where a mobile device notifies the network of its future access point, A i (l) contains only one access point. The extent of handoff guarantees depends on the specific handoff admission control algorithms employed. In principle, any of the algorithms given in [31] can be used with our scheme. These handoff algorithms differ in how handoff is executed, and in the number of neighboring cells that participate in the advanced reservation required for assured handoff. The performance guarantee during handoff is usually in the form of an upper bound on the handoff dropping probability. In the remaining part of this paper, we will focus on the calculation of internal price for IA and SA services.
D. IA and SA Algorithms
The IA and SA services are designed not to offer hard guarantees of QoS, but to provide differentiated stability and instantaneous bandwidth allocation at the session level. Each access point keeps the profiles of all users and uses the IA and SA algorithms to calculate the price-service menu dynamically based on the profile records and measured bandwidth usage.
The IA algorithm supports transactional data sessions, whose demand has to be measured and predicted rather than declared in advance by applications. The algorithm extends beyond simple price-demand calculation with a price calculation based on traffic load measurement. The load is with respect to the actual bandwidth usage, instead of reservation amount. In addition, to support our design goal of avoiding software installation in mobile devices, the IA algorithm needs to address the challenge of downlink traffic control with incomplete information due to the absence of mobile device participation in the control algorithm. This problem is solved by optimistic rate allocation. Both of the IA algorithm features (i.e., measurement-based price calculation and optimistic rate allocation) are presented in Section IV.
The SA algorithm needs to reduce the early-termination probability for SA sessions. This is performed through the admission control algorithm, which calculates the market price for the SA service. The algorithm is complicated by our usability goal of giving each SA session at least a warning interval amount of time before revoking its bandwidth reservation. The reason is that such a feature can potentially cause an arbitrage situation between IA and SA sessions, in which an IA session may benefit by switching to the SA service. The arbitrage is removed with the IA allocation pegging algorithm, as presented in Section V.
IV. INCENTIVE ENGINEERING FOR IA CLASS

A. Baseline IA Algorithm
The baseline price calculation for the IA class is based on the aggregated price-demand function, where the IA price p l,I is interpreted as a common allocation signal for users with different service purchasing power.
Since service purchasing power is a non-accumulated and non-replenished budget, a mobile device i has no benefit in conserving its IA portion of the service purchasing power ϑ i,I . That is, with a given ϑ i,I , the best strategy for the mobile device i is to declare its IA bandwidth demand that uses up the service purchasing power ϑ i,I . Therefore, the IA pricedemand function of each mobile device i is:
Here b max i,I is the maximum bandwidth of the IA class (e.g., the wireless channel capacity) that mobile device i may consume.
Summing up both sides of (3) for all the users i, we have the aggregated price-demand function,
, ∀ l, (4) where q l,I denotes the total available bandwidth for the IA class in cell l.
When all the b
are set to the channel capacity, the IA price can be simply derived from Equation (4) as:
The allocation procedure follows two steps: access points use Equation (4) to update the IA price and then broadcast the price-service menu; mobile devices then use Equation (3) to derive their IA allocations in a fully distributed manner.
B. Measurement-Based Price Calculation
The resulting allocation, however, could be largely under utilized by short-lived IA applications, such as, web transactions. A straightforward solution to this problem is to dynamically adjust b as b max i,I (t). Therefore, Equation (3) is changed to
To handle the boundary condition caused by varying b max i,I (t), we introduce ζ i,I (t), the IA unit "bid price" for a mobile device i as
We sort ζ i,I into descending order, and denote the kth highest IA unit bid price as ζ (k),I . In addition, we denote B(k) the subset of users whose ζ i,I are among the top k. Subsequently, Equation (4) can be formatted as:
where
and N is the total number of users. In addition, ζ (0),I = ∞. By inverting this equation, we have the following formula for calculating the IA price: where the partial sums are defined as follows:
Therefore, the additional work for access points to calculate the IA price is to maintain a sorted partial sums based on the IA bid price, and search for the bandwidth range (q k,I q k+1,I ] within which the available IA bandwidth q l,I fits. The aggregated price function in Equation (8) has a piecewise 1/q form. 
C. Optimistic Rate Allocation with Incomplete Information
The measurement-based IA price calculation, however, requires a per-mobile messaging protocol to notify mobile devices and their corresponding access points of the changed b max i,I (t). Such an implementation would defeat our design goal of using only a single broadcast message for IA bandwidth allocation. In what follows, we present an enhancement to the IA pricing algorithm that tolerates incomplete information resulting from the reduction of messaging.
With the absence of per-mobile messaging to notify the change of b .
Here we use the notation b * i,I to represent the bandwidth allocation derived by a mobile device, and to differentiate it from the ideal bandwidth allocation b i,I defined in Equation (6) . Since b . The rate allocation algorithm tolerates this discrepancy at mobile devices due to incomplete information. It "optimistically" controls the extent of over-allocation by measuring the actual system load and adjusting b max i,I (t) adaptively. The measurement algorithm operates over discrete time t n slotted by τ , the same measurement window used for demand measurements. τ is limited by the response time of the control system to change the regulator shaping rate. In Section VII-B, we will measure the minimum value of τ sustainable in an experimental wireless testbed. The algorithm measures the up and downlink average ratesb (t n ), respectively, over the interval
The value of b (t n ) in the past τ interval:
Here γ ≥ 1 controls the extent of over-allocation. When γ = 1, b max i,I (t) is calculated based on the average rate, which leads to the maximum extent of over-allocation. When γ 1, b
, namely the adjustment is disabled and no over-allocation is allowed.
The IA traffic load measurement is calculated with respect to the actual usage (not the amount of reservations) of the SA traffic, that is:
where C is the channel capacity, and ρ l,S (t n ) is SA traffic load. The value of γ is adjusted based on the system load condition ρ as follows: (16) is to keep ρ within a range (i.e., between κ and 100%) of the threshold load that triggers excessive delay, as discussed in [5] . In this paper, we set the threshold value to 90%. When ρ exceeds the threshold load, γ is doubled over every τ interval to quickly reduce the extent of over-allocation. When ρ falls below κ * threshold, γ is reduced by a factor of dec until reaching 1. The purpose of this is to increase the extent of over-allocation (i.e., broadcasting a smaller value of p * l,I ), encouraging bandwidth usage. In Section VII-B, we will experiment with setting of the parameters κ and dec. As a safe guard against frequent variations of p * l,I , we introduce a control parameter δ = 5% such that p rather than b i,I as the rate limit. The peak rate of downlink shaping is set as follows:
; otherwise, (deny any 0 downlink access).
(17) This approach is effective enough to control web browsing because of the asymmetry of web traffic with most traffic over the downlink. For heavy uplink users, enforcement is indirectly performed by stopping downlink traffic. If this approach still fails, the corresponding mobile device will be treated as noncompliant, and any future access to network services can be denied. Note, that this downlink-only shaping approach is also practical for the SA reservations, as discussed in the next section.
The IA bandwidth allocation and traffic regulation algorithms are designed for heavy users. For light users, the traffic regulation algorithm regulates them together as a traffic aggregate as if they are from a single user (denoted by the pseudo user #0) to allow for the free flow of sporadic control traffic. The measurement algorithm detects the change of usage from light to heavy by tracking the top few heavily used sessions of user #0. Alternatively, the measurement algorithm detects an idle usage state when b max i,I (t n ) is consistently below a threshold for a time-out interval. In this case, all the sessions of user i will be bundled into the traffic aggregate of user #0 and the measurement state for user i will be removed. Remark: We note that even though the proposed traffic enforcement does not require mobile device participation, the IA price broadcast is necessary. Cooperative mobile devices can avoid throttling their downlink traffic by flow-controlling remote senders, or sending uplink traffic within rate limits. In addition, the IA price broadcast is the minimum amount of signaling required to notify all the mobile devices of their corresponding allocations. This reduction in signaling also contributes to energy savings because only those mobile devices that are actively transmitting/receiving need to listen to the price broadcast.
The baseline IA allocation algorithm is shown in Figure 3 . We can observe the simplicity of the mobile device algorithm, due to the price-service menu broadcast protocol. The SA reservation message comprises the triplet of uplink and downlink bandwidth quantities, and the service purchasing power
. Unlike the IA class, an SA bandwidth request needs to pass admission control based on resource availability and mobility prediction, which is extended from the conventional handoff admission control algorithms found in the literature [31] . Once admitted, the allocation is guaranteed as long as the corresponding SA unit bid price satisfies ζ i,S ≥ p l i,S (t), where,
and p l i,S (t) denotes the non-monetary price of SA class in cell l where the mobile device i is active. When ζ i,S < p l i,S (t), mobile device i's SA allocation is considered to be under probation. In this case, the allocation guarantee is revoked only when the SA allocation has been continuously under probation for an interval of T S . Therefore, T S is the minimum interval over which an SA allocation is guaranteed, and applications have at least T S amount of time for rate-adaptation or renegotiation. Figure 4 shows the price-demand functions for both IA and SA classes, with the IA price-demand function shown from left to right and the SA price-demand function from right to left. The intersection of these two functions gives the spot IA price 2 p l,I . The figure also shows the decreasing allocation reliability for the SA class, following the descending bid prices. When p l,S increases, the SA sessions whose unit bid price ζ i,S < p l,S (e.g., the price block falls below the price line p l,S in the figure) will be put under probation. These mobile devices have a T S interval to renegotiate for less quantity or increase ϑ i,S , the service purchasing power for the SA class. When T S times out, the corresponding reservations will be revoked.
The SA price p l,S (t) is calculated based on the demand for the SA bandwidth from existing and handoff mobile devices. The purpose is to give preference to requests with higher bid prices. The IA price also reduces the probability that its price rises higher than the SA price, which leads to additional SA sessions entering probation, reducing the disincentives for switching from the IA to SA class.
The SA admission control algorithm measures traffic load conditional on the bid price ζ i,S in order to support the pricedifferentiated admission procedure. We denote the measured SA bandwidth demand as λ(t|p l,S ). Here λ denotes the demand over a measurement window τ , which is set to be one order of magnitude larger than the session inter-arrival timescale. In practice, we quantize the price p l,S into {p K }, where p l,S price range [ 0 ∞) is partitioned into K + 1 segments:
The quantization values p i can be set from the measured bid-price histogram, so that each quantization segment will contain roughly the same probability mass. Since a bid price is inversely proportional to the corresponding bid quantity, as shown in Equation (18) , with the assumption that the bid quantity is uniformly distributed and the SA service purchasing power does not vary much, we may set,
such that the probability mass function at each segment is the same, except for the first and last segments. Consequently, the quantization procedure needs only to specify the maximum quantized price p K and the number of quantization levels K. Denote t n the end time of each measurement interval, we have,
where t n−1 < t ≤ t n , k = 0, . . . , K and cnt b k is the sum of b i,S arrived within (t n−1 t] whose bid price
We calculate p l,S (t, ζ i,S ) over the interval t out , which is the shortest time-out interval among all sessions under probation. When there is no session under probation, t out = T S . Therefore, t out is the minimum interval at the end of which additional SA bandwidth is guaranteed to be available. Note that the departure of SA sessions within the t out interval is not counted on, because their occurrence is statistical with no guarantee.
The SA price chosen from the quantized price set {p k } needs to satisfy two constraints. The first constraint is that future SA demand regulated by price p k should not exceed the available SA bandwidth, as shown in Inequality (21) . The right-hand-side of the inequality is the available SA bandwidth. The left-hand-side of the inequality is the predicted average SA demand whose bid price is no less than p k . The control parameter γ > 0 is used to adjust the SA demand estimation.
The second constraint represented by Inequality (22) relates to the condition that the SA price should remain higher than the IA price throughout the t out interval. The right-handside of the inequality is the estimated IA price when all the allowable SA demand is met.
The choice of p l,S is then decided as:
The baseline SA allocation algorithm is shown in Figure 5 .
B. IA Allocation Pegging
So far we addressed the bandwidth-hogging problem by allowing users with higher bid prices to preempt the incumbent lower-price users after a warning interval. However, additional mechanisms are needed to discourage bursty data applications from switching from the IA to the SA service because preemption from the SA to IA service does not penalize bursty data applications.
One disincentive is the usage accounting model that can be used with the block-rate service charge. We can count the SA usage minutes by the holding time of the reservation regardless of actual bandwidth consumption. The second disincentive is the higher SA price over the IA price. The constraints (21) and (22) 
in Section V-A enforces that p l,S (t) > p l,I (t).
However, these two disincentives are insufficient to guarantee that the throughput offered to an IA service user will be always greater than the corresponding throughput the user would received using an albeit "hypothetical SA session". The complexity comes from the fact that there is no admission control for the IA service class traffic. The IA price (and subsequently the SA price) can rise sharply with a surge in IA demand. However, in the case of previously admitted SA sessions, their reservations will be maintained for T S seconds when their SA unit valuation falls below the SA price, (i.e., under probation with ζ i,S < p l i,S ). Therefore, the same SA allocation stabilizing mechanism also provides an incentive for IA users to switch to the SA service if they have prior knowledge of the increase in IA demand.
To remove this arbitrage possibility, we explicitly calculate Γ i (t), the accumulated throughput surplus of an IA session in 
S AND i is not under probation) put i under probation, start timeout timer; if (ζ i,S ≥ p l,S AND i is under probation) move i out of probation; if (i is under probation and timer expires)
remove i's SA reservation; } comparison to its hypothetical SA session. When Γ i (t) is in danger of becoming negative, the allocation for the IA session is pegged to the previous amount. The simulated hypothetical SA session uses ϑ i,I as its service purchasing power. We denoteζ i,S (t) as its bid price. Because our purpose is to simulate a strategy that maximize the received SA allocation through a (hypothetical) continuous renegotiation, we have,
Whenζ i,S (t) < p l i,S (t), the hypothetical SA session enters probation. At the end of probation, (i.e., t+T S ), it will request a new reservation with bid priceζ i,S (t + T S ) = p l i,S (t + T S ) because p l i,S represents the minimum bid price for the hypothetical SA session to be admitted. The accumulated throughput difference is calculated as follows. Whenever there are changes in IA or SA prices, the throughput accumulation is updated as follows: (25) where t − n denotes the time just before price changes. Equation (25) is a backward accounting of the accumulated Γ i (t) in the past. To enforce Γ i (t) ≥ 0, we need to predict the value of Γ i (t) when it is decreasing, (i.e., when p * l i,I (t) >ζ i,S (t)). In this case, the hypothetical SA session has been under probation because p l i,S (t) ≥ p * l i,I (t). We denote the remaining probationary period as t i,prob . If
is not large enough to cover the throughput deficit in the next t i,prob interval, then the allocation for the IA session is pegged at the valueq i,I :
The IA allocation algorithm is modified so that that during allocation pegging of session i, its state will be temporally disabled in the algorithm. Remark: We note that the algorithm is only executed for IA sessions that are under a busy period. A busy period is a consecutive interval when the measured throughput of an IA session is within, e.g., 70%, of its allocation, i.e., b
. Remark: The effect of IA allocation pegging on new sessions is that both IA and SA prices will be temporarily elevated, and SA session arrivals may face admission failure. In the worst case, a surge of IA demand may cause all the incumbent IA sessions to enter allocation pegging and all the incumbent SA sessions to enter probation. This situation lasts for at most T s interval. This duration is usually shortened when some IA sessions become idle or SA sessions terminate reservations.
VI. MOBILE DEVICE STRATEGY
The incentive algorithms discussed in the previous sections are designed to constrain a mobile user's strategy space while minimizing the amount of signaling overhead. The resulting allocation has the following properties.
A. Fairness
A bargaining solution is a rule that assigns a feasible agreement to an allocation problem, where feasibility means that the total amount of allocation is less than the total available resources and the minimum required performance of each session is guaranteed. Nash proposed four independent properties and showed that they are simultaneously satisfied only by the Nash Bargaining solution [19] .
Definition 1: An allocation is Nash Bargaining Fair when it has the following properties:
• Pareto optimal, (i.e., it is impossible to strictly increase the allocation of a user without strictly decreasing another one); • Independence of positive linear transformations, (i.e. the bargaining point is unchanged if the performance objectives are affinely scaled); • Symmetry: users with the same minimum performance measures and the same utilities will have the same performance regardless of their specific labels; and • Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: allocation is not affected by enlarging the domain if a solution to the problem with the larger domain can be found on the restricted one. [18] , the unique solution to the above maximization problem is the asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution under the condition that the user performance function f (x i ) = x i , which is a reasonable condition under our nonmonetary pricing scheme as well. Therefore, the IA allocation mechanism is asymmetric Nash Bargaining Fair.
B. Dominant Mobile Strategy
Because our incentive engineering mechanisms are designed to constraint the strategy space of users to cooperative behaviors, we have the following properties:
Proposition 2: For wireless users preferring high throughput, the dominant strategy is to subscribe to the IA service.
Proof: The best alternative strategy is the hypothetical SA session used in the allocation pegging algorithm, which subscribes to the SA service and aggressively renegotiates its bid quantity whenever p l,S is less than the previous bid price. However, the allocation pegging algorithm ensures that Γ i ≥ 0. Therefore, the accumulated throughput of an IA session is always the highest among any other alternative strategy.
Proposition 3: For wireless users preferring allocation stability, the dominant strategy is to subscribe to the SA service.
Proof: This is governed by the ranked allocation stability of the SA service and the additional T S warning interval when the bid price falls below p l,S .
In contrast, the corresponding IA service allocation is constantly changing and can fall below the SA bid quantity. Note, that the condition Γ i ≥ 0 does not prevent this because it only acts on the accumulative throughput, not the instantaneous throughput value. Because the service purchasing power ϑ i is non accumulated, mobile devices have no incentive to save it. Since the SA allocation stability is ranked by ϑ i,S /q i,S , inflating q i,S will reduce the allocation stability, while deflating q i,S will affect the application performance. Therefore, we have, Proposition 4: The dominant strategy for a wireless user of the SA service is to truthfully declare the required bandwidth amount q i,S . Remark: With the unique dominant strategy exists a singlestage game, the unique Nash equilibrium of this game is for each player to play the dominant strategy; and the corresponding finitely repeated game has a unique subgame perfect outcome: i.e., the Nash equilibrium of the single-stage game is played at every stage [33] .
For IA service users, the measurement-based allocation removes any strategic play by mobile devices. Because the access point subtracts ϑ i,S from the remaining portion of the IA class, (i.e., ϑ i,I = ϑ i − ϑ i,S ). The only decision remaining open to the mobile device is to decide how to split its service purchasing power ϑ i into ϑ i,S and ϑ i,I amounts.
The actual partition of ϑ i between the IA and SA service classes is determined by the utility function of a user, u i (q i,I , p i,S ) , which is a function of the allocation quantity of the IA class, and the bid price (which is an indicator of allocation stability) of the SA reservation. Therefore, the optimum partition of ϑ i is calculated by
A mobile device's strategy is to decide an optimal ϑ i,S based on its SA service demand q i,S and the IA service price
where α and β are control parameters. In this case,
This example provides a good intuitive strategy: when the utility valuation for the stability of the SA allocation is more important, it is optimal to use all the service purchasing power to bid for an SA allocation; when the utility valuation for the amount of IA allocation is higher, the opposite is optimal. This simple strategy can be further enhanced: a mobile device can reduce the SA bid price and only increase it at the end of the probation interval T S .
VII. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we present experimental and simulation results showing a number of beneficial properties of our incentive-based approach to delivering wireless differentiated services.
A. Wireless Testbed
To study the feasibility of wireless incentive engineering, we implemented the proposed algorithms in an experimental wireless testbed called WinCent. Figure 6 shows the WinCent testbed 4 . PCs and laptops running the Linux operating system served as access points (AP) and mobile devices (MD), respectively. The access points are interconnected to each other using 10BaseT Ethernet, forming a wireless packet cellular network using IEEE 802.11b wireless radios. In our initial implementation of the WinCent testbed all access points operate on the same channel so that mobile devices do not need to perform channel scanning for handoff control. The IP layer handoff rerouting is simply achieved by updating the ARP tables at access points (i.e., multi-homed PCs), which is managed by a proxy ARP. Since our experimental focus is not handoff performance in this paper such a rudimentary approach to handoff is suffice. We have developed more sophisticated fast handoff protocols [34] that will be integrated into a future version of WinCent. The testbed can also operate in an emulation mode so that the same algorithms can be evaluated with much larger numbers of access points and mobile devices. This is difficult to do with a small sized physical testbed. In emulation mode, the channel capacity (C l ) of a physical access point is equally divided among all the virtual access points sharing a physical access point. Similarly, the maximum bandwidth demand b max i,I of a physical mobile device is equally divided among all the virtual mobile devices executing on a physical mobile device. Such an emulation mode provides a powerful tool to study the impact of scalability on the proposed algorithms.
The wireless incentive engineering algorithms are implemented as user-level daemons controlling two Linux kernel modules. One is the Linux Traffic Control module (TC) [35] , which acts as a traffic shaper to enforce compliance to bandwidth allocations at mobile devices and access points. The other is a measurement module in a modified IEEE 802.11b wireless device driver to enable traffic snooping to measure bandwidth consumption.
The interaction of these software modules is as follows. Each mobile device is assigned a user profile indexed by the MAC address of its wireless LAN card. The user profile is stored in the network so that users cannot tamper with it. In the WinCent testbed, profiles are stored at the gateway router (GW), as shown in Figure 6 . The profile comprises the user's service plan and its associated service purchasing power. In the following test scenarios, we use three service plans (i.e., "Gold", "Silver" and "Bronze") and service purchasing power of 400, 200 and 100, respectively. We note that the absolute value of service purchasing power does not matter. We intend to use the ratio of 4:2:1 in service purchasing power to demonstrate the quality differentiation for the "Gold", "Silver" and "Bronze" plans.
A mobile device first needs to register with the access point (which can be viewed as part of the IEEE 802.11 infrastructure-mode association operation). The registration acknowledgment from the access point carries the service purchasing power for the mobile device, as well as the current IA and SA market prices. The access point daemon uses the measurement module to monitor the up and down-link traffic for all mobile devices in order to calculate the bandwidth allocation for each mobile device. In addition, the access point periodically broadcasts the dynamic price for the IA and SA services. The access point then uses the Linux TC module to limit the downlink bandwidth consumption of mobile devices based on the calculated bandwidth allocations, measured uplink bandwidth usage, and service purchasing power.
At the mobile device, a daemon instructs the measurement module to listen to the periodic IA and SA price broadcasts, as well as monitoring its uplink traffic. These values help the mobile device daemon to make adaptive decisions. By default, every new session starts by first using the IA service. Switching to an SA service and the declaration of an SA bandwidth reservation is done through a command line interface to the mobile device daemon. In the test scenarios, we use periodic pings to generate SA traffic demand and declare the SA bandwidth reservation amount to be the same as the traffic load generated by the ping application. The mobile device daemon uses its IA portion of its service purchasing power and the broadcast IA service price to derive its IA bandwidth allocation in a fully distributed manner. The mobile device then uses the Linux TC module to shape its uplink traffic to ensure that it does not exceed its allocation, preventing any reduction of its downlink traffic by the access point, should its uplink allocation be exceeded.
The goal of the mobile device daemon is to ensure that service level is acceptable given the service purchasing power expended and offered bandwidth. The monitoring module allows mobile devices to be responsive to system dynamics (e.g., service prices, offered session performances) by either changing application's behavior (e.g., requesting more or less bandwidth, or switching service) or adjusting the partition of service purchasing power between their IA and SA traffic. We note that the software modules running on mobile devices are completely optional. A mobile device without any WinCent software would ignore the price broadcast messages and transmit its uplink traffic without knowing the effect of any downlink traffic regulation at the access point. Because user profiles are kept in the network, the access point can still maintain service differentiation for such a mobile device by retrieving its service purchasing power, and regulating its downlink traffic assuming that all the traffic from the device uses the IA service.
B. Parameter Tuning
The first experiment focuses on measuring the response time performance of the Linux TC module implementation to shape traffic. The WinCent measurement-based algorithms located at mobile devices and access points use the TC module to regulate the bandwidth on the up and downlink, respectively. In this experiment we use the TC module on a single access point (AP) and measure the traffic for a single FTP download from Figure 7 shows the result of the experiment. At time 100 ms in to the trace shown in the figure, the shaping rate of TC module is changed or "cut" to zero throughput. The intention here is to measure the time elapsed before the TC module located at the access point completely reduces the traffic flow to zero. In order to improve the reliability of the statistics, the experiment is repeated ten times with different initial shaping rates. In the figure the throughput traces for the ten separate experiments are shown together with their throughput values normalized. From the figure we observe that all of the measured throughput values take an additional 16 ms to drop down to zero throughput. Most of the curves drop to zero throughput within the 16 ms response interval shown in the figure. The few curves that do not are the ones where the shaping rate is cut at a later time than 100 ms. However, all curves drop to zero within 16 ms. The value of 16 ms obtained in this experiment influences the choice of τ used by the IA measurement algorithm. However, after conducting several experiments on the wireless testbed while varying the parameter τ we noted that decreasing τ below 30 ms does not bring any benefit to the overall system performance. Based on this result, the experiments discussed in the remainder of the paper uses 30 ms for the measurement interval and price broadcasting interval unless otherwise specified. The second experiment focuses on tuning the dec and κ parameters defined in Equation (16) . Where κ acts as the lower bound of ρ (the system load) and dec controls how fast we allow over-allocation of the bandwidth. These parameters affect the trade-off between improving the utilization of the IA bandwidth that is unused by any idle mobile devices, and reducing the likelihood of congestion when idle mobile devices become active again. The experimental scenario comprises two mobile devices at a single AP consuming IA bandwidth. The first mobile device downloads a large file while the second device performs a sequence of web transactions creating on-off bursty traffic demands. When the second mobile device is idle (i.e., in an "off" interval), bandwidth could be under utilized. We measure the total amount of bandwidth left unused during an "off" interval and denote it as U . When the second mobile device is active (i.e., in an "on" interval) congestion could happen. We measure the total amount of bandwidth allocation (i.e., b max i,I (t n ) in Equation 14) for both active mobile devices during an "on" interval and denote it as O. Intuitively, a large dec leads to faster allocation of unused bandwidth to active mobile devices, but also creates the potential for more congestion when idle mobile devices become active, as discussed above. Therefore, a large dec means a smaller U but a larger O. In Figure 8 (a), we plot the value U + O against different values of dec. The plot shows that to minimize U +O, the optimal value of dec is 0.4.
We repeat the same experiments for κ in Equation (16), which decides the lower threshold to invoke adjustment of γ. A small κ means that the algorithm is satisfied with a lower bandwidth utilization, and not to redistribute unused bandwidth to active mobile devices. In contrast, a large κ will increase bandwidth utilization (reduce U ) but also increase the chance of congestion (increase O) as well because the average load of the system will be operating at a higher level. A large κ also leads to more frequent oscillations in IA bandwidth 
C. IA and SA Allocation Algorithm
In the next experiment, we use four mobile notebooks sharing the IA bandwidth at a single cell. Three of the mobile devices (#1, #3 and #4) have identical service purchasing power ϑ i , while the second mobile device (#2) subscribes to a premium service plan giving it a purchasing power ϑ i that is double that of the other mobile devices.
The first experiment presented in this section is designed to show the behavior of applications using IA allocations. The applications are either bursty in nature such as web browsing or greedy such as FTP download. Figure 9 (a) and (b) show the throughput and normalized throughput traces for the four mobile devices. In this experiment, mobile devices #1 and #2 generate web traffic, while mobile device #3 is checking emails, and mobile device #4 is downloading using FTP. The throughput growth indicates that starting early has an initial advantage. However, as the traffic enforcement mechanisms take effect, the measured throughput quickly settles to the theoretical allocation values, which are Nash Bargaining Fair, (i.e., mobile device #2 receives twice the throughput that mobile devices #1, #3 and #4 individually receive, as shown in Figure 9(a) ). In Figure 9 (b), because the throughput measurement is normalized by the service purchasing power, therefore, between 1000-3000 ms, all mobile devices receive the same normalized throughput. Figure 9(c) shows the pricing dynamics for the same experiment. The spikes in price correspond to the traffic surges in throughput measurement. These narrow price spikes also indicate the effectiveness of our pricing mechanism in regulating traffic.
In the next test scenario, four mobile devices have three different service plans (i.e., "Gold", "Silver" and "Bronze") with the associated service purchasing power set to 400, 200 and 100, respectively. In order to keep the scenario simple but at the same time demonstrate the behavior of the system under different conditions, we assume that a single mobile will use all of its service purchasing power on either the IA or SA service 5 . The nature of the traffic generated by each mobile is greedy, in the sense that a mobile device will tend to consume all of the bandwidth allocated to it. Mobile device #1 subscribes to the "Bronze" plan with the lowest service purchasing power among the four mobile devices. Mobile device #2 has a "Silver" plan with a service purchasing power twice that of mobile device #1. Mobile devices #3 and #4 have a "Gold" plan with a service purchasing power double that of the "Silver" plan. The total channel capacity (C) for this experiment is set to 500 Kb/s. The warning interval for the SA service is set to 10s. Figure 10 (a)-(d) shows traces of individual IA bandwidth consumption, individual SA bandwidth consumption, total IA/SA bandwidth consumption, and IA/SA prices, respectively. Because the x axes of these four figures are plotted over the same time horizon, these four figures can be viewed as four different aspects of the same system dynamics. At the start of the experiment, mobile device #2 uses the SA service and is granted a reservation according to its request. The SA price remains stable while the IA price is low due to the fact there is no IA consumption. Around 60s into the trace, mobile device #1 requests an SA reservation which is approved. We can also observe that the SA price still remains stable due to the fact that the demand for SA bandwidth is modest and the demand for IA remains low. However, this changes at 240 s into the trace, when mobile device #3 requests an SA reservation driving the SA price to a higher level. At this point mobile device #2 is given a warning to adjust its 5 In practice, mobile devices would partition their service purchasing power based on their application needs, service prices, and the measured service performance.
bid price or loose its reservation. Because mobile device #2 cannot afford the new SA price, it switches from SA to IA. Mobile device #1 does not loose its reservation even though it has a lower service purchasing power, due to the fact that it requested a modest reservation that it can still afford despite the increase in the SA price. Mobile device #2 enjoys higher bandwidth allocation using IA than it did using SA between 240s and 300s. This is intuitive because the IA price is lower than the SA price and mobile device #2 is currently the only consumer of IA bandwidth. When mobile device #4 joins the experiment at 300s into the trace, the effect can be seen on the usage of both mobile devices #1 and #2. The bandwidth usage of mobile device #2 drops to accommodate a new consumer (i.e., mobile device #4 ) who has a higher service purchasing power and is willing to spend all of it on the IA service. Here, we can see that, unlike what happened with the SA service in response to new demand, mobile device #2 does not loose its allocation, rather, its IA allocation is reduced in response to the new demands for IA bandwidth. The detected congestion in the IA service triggers a surge in the IA price which also drives the SA price higher due to the constraints of Ineqs (21) and (22) . As a result, mobile device #1 can no longer afford its allocation. After a 10s warning interval mobile device #1 looses its SA allocation. Mobile device #1 does not switch to the IA service but terminates its usage. The higher service purchasing power of mobile device #4 provides it with a stable allocation that remains unchanged until the end of the experiment. In contrast, mobile devices #2 and #3 continue to compete for IA bandwidth.
D. Pricing Dynamics
In this experiment, we use the WinCent emulation platform to study the pricing dynamics between SA and IA allocations. The cell capacity is set to 1 Mb/s. We simulate 50000 SA service requests according to the Poisson process. The average arrival interval is 5s. The average holding time, (i.e, without early termination) is 15s. The request quantity is uniformly distributed in [10 100] Kb/s. This translate into an average SA load of 15%. The IA traffic activity is generated by activating a random number of mobile devices every second. The random number is uniformly distributed in [1 20] . Each user's service purchasing power ϑ i is randomly assigned from two types: 50 and 100. The SA arrival measurement λ(t|p k ) is segmented over K = 20 quantized price segments, with p K = 10. The warning interval is set to T S = 20s unless stated differently. The demand estimation parameter α = 0.7. Figure 11 illustrates the session/call drop ratio and early termination ratio for each of the 20 quantized-prices. Here we can observe the effect of ranking in admission success probability and allocation stability. The early termination ratio for small SA valuations is zero because all the sessions/calls within the quantized price segments are blocked given the market price p l,S . The sharp drop in session/call blocking and early termination ratio for high quantized-prices indicates that the incentive for SA users not to inflate their bandwidth requests.
In Figure 12 , we plot the price pair {p l,I , p l,S }. We observe that because the SA prices are chosen from a set of quantized price values, the SA prices are concentrated at a few values, and hence are relatively stable with respect to the IA price dynamics.
The effect of the warning interval T S on the SA price is shown in Figure 13 . We rerun the simulation for different values of T S . The results indicate that additional service purchasing power is needed to stabilize allocations. This value increases with T S because with a large T S sessions under probation will have a longer lifetime, and the bandwidth market will have less liquidity.
Our incentive engineering mechanisms do not guarantee bandwidth reservation to avoid distorting the market price. However, a third party broker may act as an additional source of service purchasing power to sessions under probation, and Figure 14 shows the amount of service purchasing power needed for one bandwidth unit as a function of the unit valuation of the original session. Because the additional service purchasing power reflects the opportunity cost (or shadow price) of stabilizing a session's allocation, service providers could use the accumulated additional service power to charge for a guaranteed allocation service.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided a solution to the problem of engineering non-monetary incentives for edge-based wireless access services, which offer both higher throughput (IA) for bursty data applications and more stable allocation (SA) for real-time applications. Our incentive engineering model includes the use of service purchasing power and a priceservice menu to effectively constrain the strategy space of users to a set of cooperative behaviors, leading to fair usage of IA services and truthfully self-differentiation of services. The algorithmic design minimizes the protocol overhead on mo- bile devices and over-the-air. The rate enforcement algorithm controls the downlink traffic tolerating incomplete information caused by the absence of mobile device participation in the control algorithm. The reservation based SA service relieves users from declaring their session lifetime, and gives an early warning of any pending allocation degradation while keeping potential arbitrage between IA and SA services to zero. Users with higher bid-prices may preempt lower price users given a warning interval. In addition, users may follow their individual utility function to partition the service purchasing power between IA and SA allocations. The design provides differentiated relative/soft QoS among users according to their bid price and assigned service purchasing power.
We should note that even though our scheme is designed for IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN based access networks, it can also benefit cellular data networks such as GPRS [3] and CDMA2000 [4] . Because cellular networks are based on centralized control for both down/uplink at base stations, the IA control approximation discussed in Section IV-C is not necessary. However, the benefit of incentive compatibility for the design of SA and IA classes can assure service providers that users will not abuse bandwidth reservations. Finally, the WinCent source code is freely available from the Web for experimentation (http://www.comet.columbia.edu/wincent).
